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Abstract
In many developed countries, long-term care expenditures are a major source of concern, which has urged policy makers 
to reduce costs. However, long-term care financing is highly fragmented in most countries and hence reducing total costs 
might be complicated by spillover effects: spending reductions on one type of care may be offset elsewhere in the system 
if consumers shop around for substitutes. These spillovers may be substantial, as we show using a reform in the budget for 
municipalities for the most common type of publicly financed home care in the Netherlands, domestic help. This reform 
generated an exogenous change in the grant for domestic help that does not depend on changes in its demand. We show that 
the change in budget affected consumption of this care type, but that this effect was mitigated by offsetting changes in the 
consumption of three other types of home care that are financed through another public scheme and are organized through 
regional single payers. We find that a 10 euro increase in the grant for domestic help increased use of domestic help and 
nursing by 0.13 and 0.03 h per capita (4.4 and 5.2% of use in 2007), whereas it decreases use of individual assistance and 
personal care by 0.03 and 0.05 h per capita (4.1 and 2.9% of use in 2010 and 2007, respectively). As a result, the total spend-
ing effect is closer to zero than the effect on domestic help suggests. This finding means that the fragmentation of long-term 
care financing limits the ability to control expenditure growth.
Keywords Long-term care · Public insurance · Administrative data · Home care · Social care
Introduction
Government intervention to ensure equal access to long-term 
care (LTC) and to limit financial risk is heavy, and hence 
most spending on LTC comes from the public purse, even 
in the USA (OECD 2018). Rising expenditures on long-
term care for older people are a major concern in all OECD 
countries (OECD 2011). In the Netherlands, for example, 
rising LTC costs have been identified as the most important 
threat to the sustainability of overall public finance (CPB 
2014). Furthermore, the financing and organization of LTC 
is highly fragmented in virtually all these countries, which 
means that curbing spending growth requires concerted 
action from a number of organizations, whose incentives 
may not be well-aligned with each other (OECD 2011; Bakx 
et al. 2015). Consequently, the appropriate amount and the 
appropriate mix of home care services may not be achieved. 
This may also have an effect on the use of other, more expen-
sive types of care such as nursing home care and hospital 
care.
These spillover effects are a threat, in particular if types 
of LTC financed from different sources are substitutes.1 The 
effect is likely to be the largest for similar types of LTC, 
i.e., among types of home care, rather than between home 
care and institutional care, for instance. However, most 
of the previous studies have estimated substitution effects 
between broad classes of LTC—formal home care, infor-
mal home care and institutional care—and between LTC 
and other types of health care (Ettner 1994; Pezzin et al. 
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Davis and Russell 1972; Helms et  al. 1978). Recently, most studies 
are about prescription drugs, see Goldman et  al. (2007) and Glazer 
and McGuire (2012) for overviews of this strand of the literature.
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1996; McKnight 2006; Stabile et al. 2006; Bonsang 2009, 
Orsini 2010; Weissert and Frederick 2013; Guo et al. 2015; 
Karlsberg Schaffer 2015; Goncalves and Weaver 2017; Hol-
lingsworth et al. 2017). These studies disregard substitution 
among different types of home care, possibly because sur-
vey data usually contain only a limited amount of detail on 
LTC use.2 Consequently, not much is known about the forces 
driving the composition of home care, despite the important 
role assigned to home care when it comes to the containment 
of rising health care costs.
One of these forces may be the that home care financ-
ing is often fragmented and that this fragmentation causes 
spillovers: spending reductions on one type of care may be 
offset elsewhere in the system if consumers shop around for 
substitutes. We study spillovers across five types of home 
care (domestic help, individual assistance, group assistance, 
nursing and personal care). Of these, domestic help is the 
most common type of home health care and is it is organ-
ized by municipalities. Hence, we study: did a reform in 
the grant to municipalities to organize domestic help in the 
Netherlands also affect the use of the other types of home 
care, which are not organized by municipalities and which 
are financed through another scheme? Such spillovers may 
occur if individuals who are not getting all the domestic 
help that they need request more of the other types of home 
care to compensate for this. Evidence of such effects would 
indicate that changing the level of LTC spending by chang-
ing subsidies on one type of care at a time may not be very 
effective.
To this end, we use administrative panel data from the 
Netherlands containing much more details about home 
care use than typical household surveys. We observe the 
use of LTC provided at home (domestic help, individual 
assistance, nursing and personal care) as well as the use of 
LTC provided outside the home environment (group assis-
tance and institutional care). Moreover, we exploit that the 
magnitude of the reform in the subsidies for domestic help 
varied across the 400 municipalities which generates sub-
stantial variation within regions. These data have been used 
to study a number of related topics, including (correlations 
in) variation of home care use by older persons, e.g., across 
regions, or groups with different health problems or socio-
economic status (Algemene Rekenkamer 2015; CPB/SCP 
2015; SCP 2017). But they have not been used yet for esti-
mating spillovers.
Home care in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands, virtually all LTC is publicly financed 
and organized. During the study period (2007–2013), this 
was done through two schemes.3 The first scheme was the 
Exceptional Medical Expense Act (EMEA), which provides 
universal and mandatory public LTC insurance, the sec-
ond was the Social Support Act (SSA). The schemes were 
complementary with regard to the types of care they cover: 
Domestic help is paid for through the SSA and organized by 
municipalities, the other types of home care and institutional 
care are financed and organized through the EMEA.
In both schemes, the main way in which demand for care 
is restricted is through eligibility assessments. Individuals 
who want to use home care or institutional care put in a 
request for an eligibility assessment at either the independent 
agency responsible for the assessment for EMEA-financed 
care, at the municipality for SSA-financed care, or both. The 
contents of these assessments differ and they are carried out 
separately. The EMEA and SSA furthermore differ in the 
way the care is funded and providers are contracted, among 
other things. Table 1 provides a summary of the institutional 
characteristics of both schemes.
This split in LTC financing had been in place since 
2007. Domestic help had been funded through the EMEA 
scheme but was made a responsibility of municipalities 
under the SSA in 2007. This change was intended to curb 
LTC expenditures (Tweede Kamer 2004) and municipalities 
indeed kept use of domestic help in check as was intended: 
it increased by only 1% per year between 2007 and 2013, 
while total LTC spending increased by 30% over the same 
period (CBS 2014).
A major reason for this was that municipalities were given 
the means and incentives to do so. The main way in which 
municipalities can reduce spending is through tightening the 
eligibility rules. Municipalities have considerable freedom 
in setting these rules as long as they adequately compensate 
inhabitants who cannot perform daily housekeeping activi-
ties on their own and who cannot rely on others in their 
network to do them. By law, municipalities do not have to 
provide domestic help if informal caregivers can assist the 
patient (Tweede Kamer 2004). In addition, municipalities 
had an incentive to cut down on spending. Municipalities are 
compensated by an unconditional block grant and spending 
it on other things is explicitly allowed (Department of the 
Interior 2007).
2 Bonsang (2009) does however show that informal care differen-
tially affects different types of home care: It is a complement to nurs-
ing but a substitute for domestic help.
3 Since 2015, LTC has been organized and financed through three 
schemes: the Long-Term Care Act, the Health Insurance Act and 
the SSA (CPB/SCP 2015). In the discussion we elaborate on the rel-
evance of our results in the new financing scheme.
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The grant reform
The grant that municipalities received for domestic help 
in 2007 was based on expenditures in 2005. From 2008, 
onwards, the grant was calculated differently: a risk-adjust-
ment formula has been used to determine the amount that 
each of the municipalities received. The formula makes use 
of information about the composition of the population and 
the need for care, which can arguably not be affected by 
the municipalities themselves or the regional single payers 
that organize the EMEA-financed care (see “Appendix” for 
details). The grant reform that we analyze entailed a change 
in the weights of the risk-adjustment formula that was imple-
mented in 2011. Specifically, the revised version attached 
more weight to indicators on income and health care demand 
and supply (Kattenberg and Vermeulen 2017). This adjusted 
formula was announced in 2010 (Department of the Interior 
2010) following claims by municipalities in the east and 
south of the country that the initial formula did not reflect 
demand for domestic help in their jurisdictions (see for 
instance Notenboom et al. 2008). This reform redistributed 
approximately 41 million euro among municipalities.
Potential for spillovers from a reform
Older adults in the Netherlands and others who need help4 
can use five types of home care5—domestic help, individual 
assistance, group assistance, personal care and nursing—
which enable them to live at home despite their need for 
assistance. They often use multiple types of home care: 50% 
of the older adults using personal care or nursing also uses 
domestic help (Jonker et al. 2007).
Domestic help is the most common type of home care: 
about 40% of home care is provided as domestic help. Per-
sons receiving domestic help are helped with cleaning their 
house, getting groceries or cooking. People with mental dis-
abilities are also eligible for domestic help when they need 
help planning or organizing housekeeping activities. The 
latter form of domestic help can therefore overlap with (indi-
vidual) assistance, a form of LTC in which patients receive 
general assistance in organizing their lives.6
Other types of LTC are personal care (i.e., assistance with 
daily activities like dressing, showering or assistance in eat-
ing) and nursing (i.e., nursing tasks like cleaning wounds or 
providing medicine) and group assistance (i.e., learning to 
perform daily activities despite their functional limitations). 
Of these, personal care is closely related to domestic help, 
although the tasks formally do not overlap, but are com-
plementary. For instance, cooking and laying the table are 
domestic help while assistance with eating is personal care.
Because of these types of overlapping or complementary 
tasks, a change in the budget for domestic care may have 
spillover effects to personal care, nursing and individual 
assistance. This may occur when individuals who are eligi-
ble for fewer hours of domestic help than needed or wanted 
requests eligibility for other types of home care instead to 
Table 1  Public LTC financing in the Netherlands. Source: CBS (2017), Zorgcijfers (2015)
a Replaced by the Health Insurance Act (2006–current) and the new Long-Term Care Act. bIn-kind provision only
Public LTC insurance Public provision of LTC
Legal basis Exceptional Medical Expenditure Act Social Support Act
Period 1968–2015a 2007–current
Home care benefits (2013 
spending in billion 
euros)b
Nursing (0.447), personal care (2.144), individual assis-
tance (0.730), group assistance (0.490)
Domestic help (1.612)
Scheme also pays for: Institutional care, long-term mental health care, assis-
tance and transportation
Social work, social policy, home adaptations
Funded through Designated insurance premium (73%) general taxation 
(18%), cost sharing (9%)
Lump sum grant paid from general taxation (80%), cost 
sharing (20%)
Organizer 32 regional single payers 408 municipalities (in 2013)
Financial risk National government sets binding ceiling for care expen-
ditures
408 municipalities determine expenditures on care
Eligibility decisions 10 regional offices of an independent agency, based on 
national guidelines
408 municipalities, based on local guidelines (provided 
compensation for ADL problems is ‘adequate’)
Insured population Universal Universal
4 Neither of the schemes is exclusively for older people, yet 67% of 
all LTC spending is on users aged 65 and over.
5 Group assistance is not provided in the home of the care recipi-
ent and hence is, strictly speaking, not home care. Nonetheless, we 
include it here because its goal is closely related to the other types of 
home care and because it is funded and organized in the same way.
6 This overlap sometimes makes it difficult to distinguish whether 
someone should be eligible for domestic help or for individual assis-
tance (CIZ 2010).
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make up for the deficit. Indeed, the majority of nurses who 
provide personal care, individual assistance or nursing report 
they sometimes perform housekeeping activities to lower the 
burden on informal caregivers when no immediate domes-
tic help is available (Kuiken and Pronk, 2016). In addition, 
there may be an indirect effect of on the use of other types 
of home care because increased domestic care use may help 
to postpone a nursing home admission (cf. Guo et al. 2015) 




To study whether there are spillovers from domestic care 
to the other types of home care and to institutional care, we 
link administrative data at the municipal level; this is the 
level at which the reform of interest occurred. Information 
on the domestic help grant in 2007 and 2013 comes from the 
Department of the Interior (2007, 2014). From this informa-
tion, we calculate the effect of the reform on the per capita 
grant that municipalities receive by rescaling the grant using 
pre-reform population estimates to remove the influence of 
population changes (see methods sub section and “Appen-
dix” for details). This information is linked to data on the use 
of each of the types of home care (in hours per capita)7 and 
use of institutional care (in days per capita) in these years 
from administrative records from the Central Administration 
Office. Furthermore, we link population characteristics and 
data on election outcomes that are used as a proxy for local 
preferences from Statistics Netherlands and the Electoral 
Council (2014), respectively.8
Methods
To find out whether spillover effects matter when changing 
spending on one type of home care, we investigate how the 
change in the weights of the risk-adjustment formula used 
for the financing of domestic help in 2011 affected the use 
of each of the LTC types. We do so by estimating Eq. (1) 
for each of the four types home care. In this equation, the 
change in use (Δhi) is explained by the change in the grant 
for domestic help caused by the reform between the years 
2007 and 2013 (ΔGi):
To estimate this relationship, we need to account for 
third factors and general time trends. To deal with time-
invariant differences at the municipal level, we take first 
differences between 2007 and 2013. To deal with time-
variant differences, we proceed in three steps. First, the 
constant C controls for time-variant effects that are com-
mon to all municipalities, including national-level reforms.9 
The EMEA-region specific effects Er capture any deviation 
from this time trend at the EMEA-region level, which is the 
level at which regional single payers organize other types of 
home care. Second, to make sure the estimate on the grant 
is not biased by unobserved changes in demand for LTC, we 
follow Kattenberg and Vermeulen (2017) and only use the 
part of the change in the grant for domestic help caused by 
the reform, ΔGi (“Appendix” contains a detailed descrip-
tion of the reform). We refer to this measure as the coun-
terfactual grant change. The counterfactual grant change 
differs from the observed grant change as it only reflects the 
change in grant for domestic help that is due to the reform. 
Importantly, counterfactual grant change does not depend on 
changes in municipal characteristics that affect demand for 
health care, and therefore the omission of these characteris-
tics from Eq. (1) does not bias the estimated parameter .10
In short, we have constructed the counterfactual grant 
change as follows. The grant reform entailed a change in 
the weights of the risk-adjustment formula that is used to 
calculate the grant. This risk adjustment is based on indica-
tors of need at the municipal level. Over time, however, the 
population composition of municipalities changes too and 
thus the level of each of the need indicators changes. As we 
are only interested in the effect of the reform (i.e., the change 
in the weights), we need to remove the effect of the popula-
tion composition on the grant. Hence, we derive the coun-
terfactual grant change ΔGi in three steps. First, we calculate 
the size of the grant for domestic help that municipalities 
would have received in 2013 if their need indicators would 
have remained at their 2005 values. To this end, we multiply 
the weights of the need indicators in 2013 with the levels of 
these indicators from 2005. Second, we scale these amounts 
to the total amount of grant money received by municipali-
ties in 2013. Third, we subtract the amount of grant money 
(1)Δhi = C + ΔGi + Er + i
7 Except for group assistance, which is measured in the number of 
4-h shifts. Use of domestic help is observed in 2007, 2010 and 2013, 
whereas use of assistance is observed in the last 6  months of 2010 
and over 2013. Other types of health care are observed in 2007 and 
2013. Eight municipalities granted inhabitants the right to a clean 
house and therefore hours of domestic help are not recorded by CAO. 
These municipalities are dropped and therefore we have data on 400 
out of the 408 municipalities.
8 Municipalities follow four-year electoral cycles; we use data from 
the 2006 and 2010 elections.
9 All other health care is organized at the national level.
10 See the discussion of reduced form equation in chapter  4 in 
Angrist and Pischke (2008).
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received in 2007, which are also based on information from 
2005, to compute the difference over time. As a result, the 
variable ΔGi only contains variation caused by the reform of 
the grant allocation and no variation caused by the change 
in local demand for LTC.
As explained, the use of the counterfactual grant limits 
the risk that the estimated parameter  is biased due to omit-
ted variable bias. Another advantage of analyzing the grant 
reform is that it did not affect the EMEA scheme directly. 
This simplifies the interpretation of the results: any effect on 
home care within the EMEA scheme that can be attributed to 
the grant reform should run via changes in municipal poli-
cies. Equation (1) is a reduced form estimate of the effect 
of the reform on the five types home care, which means 
we are agnostic about the adjustment processes driving the 
results.11 The result may not only be driven by changes in 
use of domestic help, but also by the use of other municipal 
social services and there may be direct and indirect effects 
(e.g., through informal care or other types of formal care). 
Although we cannot separately identify the drivers of adjust-
ments, the results are still informative as reforms in these 
type of grants are a major policy instrument for national 
governments in shaping the mix of home care that older 
people receive, especially in the context of home care, which 
is often organized at the local or regional level and financed 
through a patchwork of schemes (Bakx et al. 2015; OECD 
2011).
Finally, as the reform itself might be targeted toward spe-
cific municipalities,12 in a series of robustness checks, we 
include control variables for pre-reform demand for LTC 
and political preferences at the municipal level. Specifically, 
we include control variables on age, income and the health 
condition of the municipality population as these variables 
might affect demand for home care. We also include the 
share of the population belonging to a minority group and 
population density as minorities make less use of domes-
tic help and providing domestic help is less expensive in 
densely populated areas (due to reduced travelling time), 
see Jonker et al. (2007) and Van Eijkel et al. (2017). Further-
more, we condition on the main intergovernmental (block) 
grant that municipalities receive from the central govern-
ment and the vote shares going to (1) left wing parties, (2) 
Christian democratic parties and (3) local and other parties. 
We do so as the budget and the composition of the munici-
pal council might affect the budget the municipality spends 
on health care and social services. We condition for these 
demand and supply characteristics by including lagged lev-
els of these covariates, i.e., they are measured before the 
reform took place. In addition, we perform the robustness 
checks by controlling for the difference in these covariates 
over the period 2007–2013.13
Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows that the average per capita grant for domestic 
help rose by 3.48 euro per capita (3.8%). Part of this increase 
is caused by changes in the composition of the population, as 
illustrated by the lower average counterfactual grant change 
of (2.48 euro per capita on average). This average amount 
masks substantial changes at the municipal level, however, 
as for some municipalities the value of the counterfactual 
grant changed by more than 40 euro per capita (Fig. 1).
Trends in use differ by care type. Use of domestic help 
rose moderately on average, whereas personal care use and 
group assistance increased strongly and use of nursing fell 
substantially. The use of individual assistance was virtually 
unchanged.
Regression results
Table 3 and Fig. 2 summarize our main regression results. 
They suggest a ten-euro increase in the grant for domestic 
help increases the use of domestic help with 0.13 h, i.e., 
8 min (column 1 of Table 3). At an average rate of 22 euro 
per hour (Van Eijkel et al. 2017—Appendix Table 5), this 
means that municipalities spend about 3 euro on this specific 
service when the grant increases by 10 euro (column 2 of 
Table 3).
Next, we consider the effect on overall EMEA-financed 
home care. Our results present some evidence that a ten-euro 
per capita increase in the grant for domestic help causes a 
drop in EMEA-financed home care of 4 min per capita (ten 
times 0.06 h), but it had no significant effect on total expen-
ditures on these types of care. This difference occurs because 
the prices of EMEA-financed types of care differ.
Specifically, Table 3 shows that a ten-euro increase in 
the grant for domestic help leads to a decrease in the use of 
personal care of 3 min per capita (ten times 0.005 h times 
11 It would be tempting to use the grant reform as an instrument for 
use of domestic help in an instrumental variable analysis. However, 
the exclusion restriction for such a specification does not hold as 
municipalities are not obliged to spend additional funds on domestic 
help and they may spend part of the money on other services for frail 
older people.
12 For instance, Knight (2002) shows that the US federal government 
grants for highways is biased towards states with a large demand for 
highways.
13 These changes may be influenced by the reforms, making them 
bad controls, and hence are not included in the main specification (cf. 
Angrist and Pischke 2008).
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60 min) and of individual assistance of 1 min per capita (ten 
times 0.002 h times 60 min). Using listed maximum prices 
of these types of home care, these changes convert to a 2.6 
euro decrease in expenditures on personal care and a 0.9 
euro decrease in expenditures on assistance. For nursing we 
find evidence suggesting the opposite: a ten euro increase 
in the grant for domestic help increases the use of nursing 
by 2 min per capita implying a 2.0 euro increase in expendi-
tures.14 We do not find evidence that the use or expenditures 
on group assistance are affected by the reform in the grant 
for domestic help (Table 3). As group assistance is related 
to the other types of LTC, yet provided outside of the home 
environment, this strengthens our belief that our estimates 
reflect substitution of LTC provided at home.
Taken together, the effects of the reform of the grant 
for domestic help on i) the use of domestic help and ii) on 
EMEA-financed home care show that a ten-euro increase in 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics
Changes in LTC use are for the period 2007–2013, unless specified otherwise. Assistance in 2010 observed 
from week 25 onwards. Therefore, the change in uptake of individual assistance and group assistance 
between 2010 and 2013 is computed after multiplying the 2010 observations with 1/(52–25)*52. Domestic 
help, individual assistance, nursing and personal care are measured in total hours divided by the munici-
pal population in 2000, group assistance and institutional care are measured in total shifts and total days 
divided by the population in 2000, respectively. Lagged control variables are measured in 2005, except for 
the vote shares, which are the outcome of the 2006 election. Change in control variables are the change 
over the period 2007–2013, except for the vote share, which are the change between 2006 and 2010
Mean SD Minimum Maximum N
LTC use per capita in minutes: change over time
Domestic help 9.0 37.2 − 201.6 109.2 400
Personal care 54.6 33.6 − 34.8 186.0 400
Nursing − 15.6 10.8 − 72.6 23.4 400
Individual assistance (2010–2013) 0.0 13.8 − 93.0 51.6 394
Group assistance (2010–2013) 6.0 12.0 − 33.6 61.8 394
Institutional care − 6.0 42.6 − 240.0 228.6 400
Domestic help grant (euros per capita): change over time
Change grant for domestic help 2007–2013 3.48 18.06 − 55.12 61.15 400
Reform of the grant for domestic help 2.58 15.97 − 47.10 52.28 400
Lagged control variables
Vote share left wing parties 26.83 15.04 0.00 73.75 400
Vote share Christian democratic parties 26.75 13.16 0.00 86.92 400
Vote share local and other parties 29.97 17.63 0.00 100.00 400
Share of the population aged 75 or older 6.29 1.53 2.61 13.16 400
Average personal income in 1.000 euro 14.60 1.59 10.21 23.06 400
Share of the population belonging to a minority group 12.38 7.16 2.29 50.89 400
Mortality rate 0.82 0.19 0.31 1.87 400
Population density 763.56 931.59 25.00 5711.00 400
Change in control variables
Vote share left wing parties − 7.82 8.36 − 60.01 17.56 400
Vote share Christian democratic parties − 3.90 8.85 − 62.61 23.33 400
Vote share local and other parties 7.73 19.82 − 27.19 99.30 400
Share of the population aged 75 or older 1.09 0.59 − 0.81 3.01 400
Average personal income − 1.33 0.86 − 9.06 2.93 400
Share of the population belonging to a minority group 0.27 0.38 − 0.53 2.88 400
Mortality rate 0.07 0.11 − 0.25 0.61 400
Population density 12.42 73.24 − 471.35 430.00 400
14 The increase in nursing associated with the increase in the grant 
for domestic help may have many reasons. We speculate that it might 
for instance be that domestic help enables patients with severe func-
tional limitations to leave the hospital sooner and that these patients 
need more nursing, or that increase domestic help enables the 
regional authorities that organize EMEA-financed care to restruc-
ture the home care that they provide. Highly specific data—or quali-
tative research—may shed light on which mechanisms may play a 
role. However, the distinction between nursing and personal care is 
abolished after the 2015 reform, meaning that the aggregate spillover 
effect matters most for policymakers.
Footnote 14 (continued)
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the grant for domestic help increases the use of home care by 
about 5 min (ten times 0.008 h times 60 min) per capita. This 
estimate is almost 40% lower than the effect of the reform on 
domestic help alone. In fact, the change in aggregate home 
care spending, which is the sum of the changes in the use of 
each of the types of home care multiplied by their respective 
prices, is not significantly different from zero. Finally, we do 
not find evidence that the reform in the grant for domestic 
help influenced institutional care use.
The robustness checks show that the results are largely 
unaffected after including four sets of lagged level or 
changes of variables that proxy for preferences for LTC 
policy (Table  4—Columns 2 and 3), proxies for LTC 
demand (Columns 4 and 5), changes in the other funds that 
municipalities receive from the central government (Column 
6) and changes in the hourly co-payment for domestic help 
(Column 7). The effects on individual types of home care 
are the same or similar in all specifications, while the total 
spillover effect is significant at the 10-percent level in all but 
two specifications. The effect on the total number of hours of 
home care used is significant and equal in all specifications.
Conclusion
In most countries, LTC is subsidized and organized through 
a patchwork of public schemes. Changes in one scheme have 
implications for use of the care subsidized through other 
schemes and these spillover effects need to be accounted for 
when evaluating the effects of a reform. This article exploits 
detailed administrative records on LTC use and exogenous 
changes in the grant that municipalities in the Netherlands 
receive to organize domestic help to estimate the spillover 
effects on other types of home care and on institutional care 
which are financed through another financing scheme.
Prior research (Ettner 1994; Pezzin et al. 1996; McK-
night 2006; Stabile et al. 2006; Stuck 2008; Bonsang 2009, 
Orsini 2010; Weissert and Frederick 2013; Guo et al. 2015; 
Karlsberg Schaffer 2015; Goncalves and Weaver 2017; 
Hollingsworth et al. 2017) has treated home care as a sin-
gle type of care, possibly because of data limitations, and 
focused on substitution of home care with institutional care 
Fig. 1  Distribution of reform in grant for domestic help (2007–2013)
Table 3  Regression results
Dependent variables measured in total hours divided by municipal population in 2000. The grant reform 
is measured as total euro divided by municipal population in 2000. Changes in dependent and independ-
ent variables are calculated as the difference between 2013 and 2007 values, except for the analyses with 
the change in the use of assistance as the dependent variable for which the difference is between 2013 and 
2010. Expenditures on LTC computed by multiplying use of care times prices of LTC (listed in Table 5). 
All specifications contain indicators for EMEA regions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** 
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Dependent variable (1) (2) N
Effect of grant reform on per 
capita use in hours
Effect of grant reform on per capita 
spending in 2013 euros
Δ Domestic help 0.013 (0.003)*** €0.290 (€0.056)*** 400
EMEA-financed care
Total spillover effect − 0.006 (0.003)* − €0.172 (€0.150) 394
Δ Personal care − 0.005 (0.002)** − €0.257 (€0.107)** 400
Δ Nursing 0.003 (0.001)*** €0.197 (€0.058)*** 400
Δ Assistance (group) − 0.001 (0.001) − €0.017 (€0.011) 394
Δ Assistance (individual) − 0.002 (0.001)** − €0.090 (€0.036)** 394
All home care




Δ Institutional care − 0.000 (0.003) – 400
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and informal care. Yet, substitution between different types 
of home care financed through separate systems is at least 
as likely, and our results show that it might be as relevant 
for governments and insurers seeking to limit public spend-
ing and ensuring an effective and equitable allocation.
The reform in the grant for domestic help increased the 
use of domestic help: A 10 euro increase led to an 8-minute 
increase on average meaning that municipalities spent on aver-
age 30% of the additional funds on domestic help. In addition, 
the results show that there are substantial spillovers from the 
reform: A 10 euro increase in the grant decreased the use of 
other types of home care targeted at older people by almost 
4 min. Consequently, almost half of the change in domestic 
help use is undone by the changes in the other types of home 
care. This spillover effect means that the reform in the grant 
for domestic help had a smaller effect on total home care 
use than is apparent from studying the change in domestic 
help use alone. In monetary terms, the spillover effects on 
the other, more expensive, types of home care are even more 
striking: The change in spending on domestic help is can-
celled out by decreases on the other types of LTC provided at 
home, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that aggregate 
LTC expenditures remained unaffected.
Like McKnight (2006) but unlike a couple of other stud-
ies (Ettner 1994; Pezzin et al. 1996; Orsini 2010; Guo et al. 
2015), we do not find an effect of changes in home care 
Fig. 2  Illustration of main 
regression results in Table 3. 
Panel a: change in use following 
a 10 euro per capita increase 
in grant. Panel b: change in 
expenditures (in 2013 euros) 
following a 10 euro per capita 
increase in grant
Panel A: change in use following a 10 euro per capita increase in grant
Panel B: change in expenditures (in 2013 euros) following a 10 euro per capita increase in grant
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subsidies on use of institutional care. A potential explana-
tion for the absence of an effect on institutional care is that 
formal care delivered at home or informal caregiving is a 
closer substitute than institutional care for domestic help.
Our results are of direct relevance to policymakers in the 
Netherlands as well as in other countries in which the financ-
ing of LTC is fragmented. As Belgium and Switzerland have 
the same split in home care funding as the Netherlands (Bakx 
et al. 2015)—and in many other countries LTC financing is 
split between separate schemes in other ways (OECD 2011)—
these findings suggest that similar spillover effects might occur 
elsewhere. The limited ability to alter long-term care spending 
growth caused by spillover effects that we document is likely 
to be an inherent negative consequence of this fragmentation.
A major strength of our analysis is that we use detailed 
administrative data on all home care use in the Netherlands 
and that the level of an observation in this data is also the level 
at which decisions are made. Moreover, our analysis limits the 
omitted variable bias and the main variable of interest—the 
change in the grant to municipalities—is also the main policy 
lever that is used to influence the use of domestic help, which 
facilitates a straightforward interpretation of the result and 
enhances its relevance. A limitation of our analysis is that 
municipalities are free to spend to grant as they wish and that 
the change in the grant may have affected other programs, 
which in turn affects the use of home care as well. There is no 
data available to estimate the relative importance of these other 
channels and consequently we only estimate the total effect of 
the grant change on the use of home care, not how this total 
effect came about. Moreover, reforms that affect the amount 
and the composition of home care that is provided might also 
influence the amount of informal care that is provided. Because 
there is no data at the municipal level about informal caregiv-
ing in the Netherlands, we have not studied this spillover, but 
prior research from other countries shows that this might indeed 
occur (Stabile et al. 2006; Karlsberg Schaffer 2015).
Moreover, in 2015, a broad set of LTC reforms has been 
implemented in the Netherlands which further complicated 
LTC financing. These reforms included a 30% reduction in 
the budget that municipalities received for domestic help 
Table 4  Robustness checks
Changes in dependent and independent variables are calculated as the difference between 2013 and 2007 values, except for the analyses with the 
change in the use of assistance as the dependent variable for which the difference is between 2013 and 2010. All specifications contain indicators 
for EMEA regions. Robust standard errors in parentheses
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(Department of the Interior 2014) and the decentralization of 
assistance to municipalities. The other types of home care are 
now financed through the Health Insurance Act and organ-
ized by health insurers, while institutional care is still cov-
ered through the public LTC insurance scheme. Although the 
results of our study cannot be translated one-to-one to this 
new situation, our results do suggest that these reforms may 
urge municipalities to integrate assistance, domestic help and 
other services that they offer. This is an advantage, because 
our results show that there are substantial spillovers to the use 
assistance when the budget for domestic help changes and 
municipalities are now incentivized and thus more likely to 
incorporate these spillovers on assistance when deciding about 
spending on domestic help. On the other hand, these reforms 
mean that coordination between assistance and the types of 
home care that are now organized by health insurers (nursing 
and personal care) has become more complicated. If similar 
spillovers exist when the budget for assistance is changed as 
we observed for domestic help, this means that budget cuts on 
assistance might lead to higher costs for health insurers.
Furthermore, our results suggest that these spillo-
ver effects matter for public LTC financing: The effect of 
changes in the budget for domestic help on total home care 
spending was mitigated because they are compensated for 
elsewhere in the system. Hence, our results lend credibility 
to the belief that the 2015 budget cuts had important spillo-
vers to other types of home care, but not to institutional care 
or group assistance. Moreover, our results show that a full 
evaluation of reforms of the effects complicated LTC financ-
ing systems in the Netherlands and elsewhere should focus 
on all types of home care, including those financed through 
other systems. In addition, our results show that decentrali-
zation by providing a block grant to municipalities means 
that a large part of the funds may be spent on other things 
than home care when the funds are not earmarked.
Lastly, although it can be optimal to finance related health 
care services in separate schemes, our results show that such 
a split can reduce the ability to keep total spending in check 
because of coordination problems. As LTC financing is 
split between separate schemes in many countries (OECD 
2011; Bakx et al. 2015), these findings suggest that similar 
spillover effects might occur elsewhere too. These spillovers 
need to be considered when reforming LTC financing. In 
addition, societies that seek to limit LTC spending in the 
long run may consider alternative ways of achieving this, 
including reablement programs that limit the development 
functional limitations or restore abilities in older populations 
(cf. Lewin et al. 2013; Tuntland et al. 2015; Winkel et al. 
2015; Zingmark et al. 2017, 2019; Metzelthin et al. 2018).
Acknowledgements This research uses non-public data available at 
Statistics Netherlands. Pieter Bakx acknowledges funding from the Net-
work for Studies on Pensions, Ageing and Retirement, the Netherlands. 
We are grateful to Timo Lambregts, Erik Schut, Wouter Vermeulen and 
seminar participants at the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Pol-
icy Analysis, the Netspar International Pension Workshop, the EUHEA 
conference and the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports of the Neth-
erlands for comments on earlier versions of this paper.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attri-
bution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adapta-
tion, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long 
as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, 
provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes 
were made. The images or other third party material in this article are 
included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated 
otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in 
the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not 
permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will 
need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a 
copy of this licence, visit http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/.
Appendix
Types of LTC
 Table 5 describes the types of LTC studied in this paper.
Description of the domestic help grant allocation
This appendix provides more detail on the grant allocation 
formula. The formula was developed for the Department of 
the Interior and was used for the first time in 2008. A revised 
version, implemented in 2011, attached more weight to indi-
cators on income and health care demand and supply (see 
Table 5  Types of LTC
Descriptions based on CIZ (2012), van Van Eijkel et al. 2017). Prices are maximum unit prices in euro in 2013, except for domestic help which 
is the average price per hour (Van Eijkel et al. 2017; NZA 2013a, b)
Type Price Brief description
Domestic help 23 Help with managing the household
Group assistance 46.82 Assistance with maintaining a structured life by providing group activities
Individual assistance 53.29 Assistance with activities of daily living and with maintaining a structured life; 
increasing self-reliance (including psychosocial self-reliance)
Personal care 49.45 Performing tasks that a person usually carries out herself (self-care)
Nursing 73.88 Performing nursing tasks; signaling, supporting and counseling; practicing self-care
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Kattenberg and Vermeulen 2017). In Table 6, we list the 23 
need indicators and the weights that were used to distribute 
the grant for domestic help to municipalities in 2013 (col-
umn 1). The size of the grant a municipality received in 
2013 equaled the sum of the municipal score on the need-
indicators times their weights.
Column 2 shows the average share of grant money distrib-
uted by a need-indicator. Clearly, not all need-indicators are 
equally important: the most important variable distributes 
about 20% of grant money on average, whereas the least 
important one distributes less than 0.1 promille. We have 
ordered the need-indicators into four groups. This grouping 
shows that about two-third of the grant is distributed using 
eight indicators related to average income. Almost 20% of 
grant money is distributed using eleven variables on munici-
pal population and about 12% is distributed using two indi-
cators on health care demand and supply. The fourth group 
of other indicators distributed only about 1%.
The change in the grant for domestic help due to the 
reform is computed as follows: First, we take the 2013 
Table 6  Allocation formula for domestic help in 2013
a Share equal to the average value of the indicator times its weight divided by the sum of average values of indicators times their weights. As one 
weight is negative, we have used the absolute values of weights
b Function equal to the maximum of zero or [(the number of people with low income divided by the housing stock) minus 0.1]
c Function equal to the average municipal income over municipal income minus 0.55
d Equal to 26 times the capacity in mental health care plus 132.3 times the capacity in nursing houses plus 365 times the capacity mentally disa-
bled health care. Capacity measured in number of beds
e Function equal to (share of population that is chronically ill minus 0.11) times population size
Indicator Weight Percentagea
Indicators on composition of the municipal population
Population size 0.32 0.42
Population younger than 19 0.26 0.08
Population younger than 65 8.17 8.92
Population aged 65 or older and younger than 75 0.23 0.03
Population aged 75 or older and younger than 85 0.23 0.01
Population 85 or older 0.23 0.00
Population belonging to a minority group 0.83 0.09
Potential number of people visiting from nearby municipalities 1.49 1.96
Single person households with head aged 65 or older and younger than 75 31.77 0.92
Single person households with head aged 75 or older and younger than 85 127.06 3.38
Single person households with head aged 85 or older 222.36 2.92
Subtotal 18.7
Indicators related to average income
Households with low income 0.98 0.17
Number of people who receive social support excluding those on welfare 80.36 5.82
Function of people with low incomes times the number of households with head aged 65–74b 263.20 3.93
Function of people with low incomes times the number of households with head aged 75–84b 1052.82 9.73
Function of people with low incomes times the number of households with head aged 85 or  olderb 1842.43 6.1
Function of relative average income times the number of households with head aged 65–74c 226.90 8.31
Function of relative average income times the number of households with head aged 75–84c 907.61 20.5
Function of relative average income times the number of households with head aged 85 or  olderc 1588.31 12.71
Subtotal 67.3
Indicators on health care demand and supply
Local capacity health  cared 1.01 1.80
Function of number of people who are chronically  ille 239.60 10.92
Subtotal 12.7
Other indicators
Municipal housing density times housing stock over 1000 − 0.44 0.51
Lump sum transfer 24,263.31 0.78
Subtotal 1.3
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weights of the allocation formula and multiply them with 
the corresponding demand indicators measured in 2005. We 
use this result to compute the share of total grant money that 
each municipality would have received in 2013 given the 
value of the demand indicators in 2005. Second, from this 
share we subtract the share of total grant money a munici-
pality received in 2007. Third, this difference is multiplied 
by the total amount of grant money supplied in 2007 and 
divided by population of the municipality to express the 
grant change in euro per capita. Defining the instrument this 
way means that variation is only caused by pre-reform needs.
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